14 November 2013
As it
turned out the preparations made by the government to diminish the damaging
effects of Yolanda was no match against the super typhoon’s force and ferocity. Damage to property and infrastructure along
its path was tremendous, but more sorrowful is the loss of thousands of lives .
The
massive damage to property was not really unexpected given the typhoon’s 315
km/h sustained wind speed and the 378 km/h gusts, but the magnitude of deaths
was, I would say, a shocker given that the government have reportedly evacuated
about 800,000 persons to keep them safe from the threat of landslides, floods
and storm surge.
The
government was pushing for “zero casualty” in line with the President’s
directive, but this did not materialize. Instead, a little over 2,380
fatalities – about 800 from Tacloban City - had been confirmed so far (as of
Thursday morning), and this figure is expected to still increase as the reports
from the affected LGUs are completed.
In last
Tuesday’s column (PJ, November 12) I related how despite the short 2-1/2 day
lead time, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council sprang
into action the various local DRRMCs in 9 regions to prepare for the super
typhoon’s onslaught.
Corresponding
directives complementing the local DRRMC preparations were simultaneously given
by Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas to concerned LGU
officials, as well as the other resources under the DILG, like the PNP, the BFP
and the PCG. Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, meanwhile, was directed by the
President to take charge of the preparation and to “…exert all effort to attain
the zero casualty goal.”
In the
same manner, President Noynoy, on the evening of November 7, went on national
radio and television to inform the public that the disaster and risk management
councils in the threatened regions are ready. He also mentioned that the other
government assets like the PAF planes (particularly the three C-130 cargo
planes) and the Navy ships are also already in position for relief and rescue
operations. He however warned that Yolanda would be worse than the typhoon
Pablo which caused thousands of deaths last year, and prayed that the super
typhoon would not cause much damage. He also called on the public to help
lessen the storm’s impact by consulting the web sites of the PAGASA (for flood
and storm surge info) and the MGB (for landslide threats) to have a better idea
on the danger conditions in their area.
But then
Yolanda’s force (mentioned by international sources as 3.5 times more powerful
than the super Hurricane Katrina that ravaged New Orleans in 2005) was just too
much. Despite the preparations made by both the national and local governments
to mitigate its damaging effects, it still caused thousands of deaths,
unprecedented damage to property, infrastructure and vital utilities (like
power, transport and communication) that caused the total isolation of regions
in, and in the immediate vicinity where its center passed. To my mind, if I am
to base my opinion on what I have seen on TV and heard on radio, the
exceptional force of Yolanda was also manifested in not only its being able to
stun, but in practically decimating the very structures installed on the ground
to mitigate its effects– namely the local DRRMCs as well as the LGUs that were
in its direct and immediate paths.
And why do
I say this? Well because the people tasked to lead and run these structures
also ended up being victims themselves, as no one was spared. So, in the
immediate aftermath of the typhoon (if I am to use the situations of Guian and
Tacloban as example) there was no LGU, no local DRRMC, or even a police force
functioning. There were only stunned, confused, clueless and helpless survivors
whose priority, understandably, were that of concern for their family members
and loved ones.
Well, what has happened has happened, and
I believe that the immediate concern at this point is that of getting a
complete picture of the calamity’s magnitude as fast as possible, pinpointing
and rescuing those that can still be rescued, and speeding up the delivery of
relief and aid to the injured and survivors, as well as the others that are
affected, estimated by the NDRRMC to number as much as 9.68 million people in
41 provinces (http://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/11/11/1255515/over-9.6-million-people-affected-yolanda-ndrrmc).
As the national government, hampered by its limited resources
struggled to respond to the emergency, the rest of the nation, shocked as it
was, immediately mobilized - as usual - to generate and provide relief aid to
the typhoon’s victims. International aid also started to flow in after a few
days. However, in spite of the availability of relief materials, both of the
government and private sector’s relief effort encountered snags during the
first 5 days after the typhoon. This, I believe, is because of the blocked
roads and damaged airports, the non-availability of sufficient land transport,
sea transport and airlift capability. Relief, it seems to me, was hampered as
well by the absence, if not disappearance of the “local distribution network,
or infrastructure” that can deliver the aid materials directly to the typhoon’s
victims.
The situation however, I think, would start improving now that the
President has declared a state of national calamity which allows the national
government to have a more direct hand in responding to the devastation. The
access road for relief cargo trucks going to Samar and Leyte have been cleared,
and the number of boats ferrying cargo trucks (across San Bernardino Straight)
have been increased, easing the bottleneck that stalled the movement of aid
cargo trucks. Also, cargo air lift capability has been greatly enhanced by the
arrival of 8 C-140 cargo planes and some helicopters from the US Air Force, and
would even be improved further with the expected arrival of the aircraft
carrier USS George Washington, as well as other assets committed by the
international community.
Due to
space limitations, the lessons that can be gained from the Yolanda experience
shall be covered in the next column as Part 3 of this article. Meanwhile,
comments/reactions will be appreciated and can be sent through this writer’s
email (sl3.mekaniko @gmail.com) or this writer’s blog (http://mekaniko-sl3.blogspot.com)