Lessons from Yolanda (1)

11 November 2013

The most powerful typhoon that is said to have made a landfall caused, so far, a confirmed loss of hundreds of lives (but with grave fears of higher levels) as well as damage to private property and infrastructure, mostly in the Visayas.

The final magnitude of the damage it caused is still slowly unfolding while this article is being written, as the government gradually re-establishes access to the affected and isolated LGUs, and restores the various means of communication.

This typhoon, which the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (of the US Navy and US Air Force based in Hawaii) began monitoring on November 2 - as if formed in the Pacific Ocean – was upgraded into a Tropical Storm (and assigned the name Haiyan) by the Japan Meteorological Agency on November 4, and intensified into a typhoon by November 5.  It further strengthened into a super (or Category 5) typhoon on November 6 before it entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility on November 7.  By this time, already assigned with its local name “Yolanda”, it progressed along the country’s eastern seaboard towards Eastern Visayas and made the first of its five landfalls at 4:40 A.M. of November 8 in Guiuan, Eastern Samar, with an estimated sustained winds of 315 km/h, and gusts up to 378 km/h (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Typhoon_Haiyan).

The government was not remiss in monitoring and preparing for the storm. While still focused on the Tropical Depression Wilma which made a landfall on November 4 in Surigao del Sur - and brought heavy rains over large parts of Mindanao and the Visayas, PAGASA’s weather forecasters already noted the existence of Haiyan/Yolanda. The forecasters also indicated a high possibility of the typhoon hitting land because of the prevalence during this part of the year of northeasterly winds that tends to push a “typhoon’s path” further down (towards the South part of the country).

On November 5, as Wilma weakened and on her way to the West Philippine Sea, PAGASA advised the public to “brace” for storm Haiyan indicating that it could intensify into a super typhoon and, moving westward at 25 kph, is expected to make landfall over the Leyte-Samar Area Friday afternoon, November 8.

This development triggered the National Risk Reduction and Management Council to place nine regions in the country (namely Caraga, Northern Mindanao, Central, Eastern and Western Visayas, Bicol Region, Southern Tagalog, and Metro Manila) under Blue alert to prepare for the typhoon.

With just about 2-1/2 days of lead time the government scrambled to prepare to mitigate the damaging effects of the super typhoon; notably the governors of Cebu, Bohol and Albay were among the first reported to have suspended classes in all levels in their provinces  starting November 7 – with the Albay governor even including suspension of all government offices on that day.

Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas, reportedly, also tasked on November 6 “…local officials in the Visayas and Bicol Regions to prepare their constituents for the expected onslaught of the typhoon…activate their local DRRMCs and disaster monitoring systems…immediately adopt measures to effectively warn residents, particularly those living along the coastlines and other danger areas…seek assistance from the local police, the Bureau of Fire Protection, the Philippine Coast Guard, and other first responder units in case there is any need to evacuate residents from danger zones…mobilize all government vehicles that may be needed in the evacuation process and put in place search and rescue teams…[as well as]identify and prepare evacuation centers and preposition relief goods for distribution” (PhilStar, November 7).

President Aquino meanwhile – and also on the same day “…directed Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin to take charge of preparations…and exert all effort to attain the zero casualty goal.”

At this point in time, the NDRRMC had already mobilized all its attached agencies, particularly those that are in the Visayas Region; the Philippine coast Guard had mobilized newly acquired boats for rescue operations, the PNP had activated its Disaster Incident  Management Task, the NCRPO had been alerted for possible rescue operations in the Metro Manila cities perennially usually submerged by floodwaters, and the DSWD had also prepositioned emergency relief resources, composed of standby funds, family food packs as well as non-food items in the regions that would be affected.

On the evening of November 7, the President once more addressed the nation and warned that Yolanda would be worse than Typhoon Pablo which caused more than a thousand deaths in Eastern Mindanao last year. And although he informed the public that all the disaster and risk management councils in the threatened regions are ready, he prayed that the super typhoon would not cause much damage.

He also mentioned other preparations such as having consulted with the DOST and the Mines and Geosciences Bureau regarding ideas on how to deal with the monster typhoon, as well as his sending Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and DILG Secretary Mar Roxas to Leyte to lead the preparations there. He also added that the three C-130 cargo planes as well as 32 other planes and helicopters of the PAF are already standing by, and 20 ships from the Philippine Navy are already positioned (in Cebu, Bicol, Cavite and Zamboanga) and ready for relief and rescue operations.

The President also called on the public to help lessen the impact of the storm and consult with the websites of the PAGASA and the MGB to have a better idea on the danger conditions in their area.

Despite all of these effort by the National Government, its concerned agencies (like the NDRRMC, DND, DILG, DOST, PAGASA, MGB, DSWD, AFP, PNP, etc.) and the concerned LGUs, it was just no match against the fury of a super typhoon that packs winds of 315 km/h, and gusts of up to 378 km/h that not only demolished even concrete structures but also completely isolated the ravaged areas both physically and in terms of complete communication block out.

Due to space limitations, the lessons that can be gained from the Yolanda experience shall be covered in the next column as Part 2 of this article. Meanwhile, comments/reactions will be appreciated and can be sent through this writer’s email (sl3.mekaniko @gmail.com) or this writer’s blog (http://mekaniko-sl3.blogspot.com)