Lessons from Yolanda (2)

14 November 2013

As it turned out the preparations made by the government to diminish the damaging effects of Yolanda was no match against the super typhoon’s force and ferocity.  Damage to property and infrastructure along its path was tremendous, but more sorrowful is the loss of thousands of lives .

The massive damage to property was not really unexpected given the typhoon’s 315 km/h sustained wind speed and the 378 km/h gusts, but the magnitude of deaths was, I would say, a shocker given that the government have reportedly evacuated about 800,000 persons to keep them safe from the threat of landslides, floods and storm surge.

The government was pushing for “zero casualty” in line with the President’s directive, but this did not materialize. Instead, a little over 2,380 fatalities – about 800 from Tacloban City - had been confirmed so far (as of Thursday morning), and this figure is expected to still increase as the reports from the affected LGUs are completed. 

In last Tuesday’s column (PJ, November 12) I related how despite the short 2-1/2 day lead time, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council sprang into action the various local DRRMCs in 9 regions to prepare for the super typhoon’s onslaught.

Corresponding directives complementing the local DRRMC preparations were simultaneously given by Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas to concerned LGU officials, as well as the other resources under the DILG, like the PNP, the BFP and the PCG. Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, meanwhile, was directed by the President to take charge of the preparation and to “…exert all effort to attain the zero casualty goal.”

In the same manner, President Noynoy, on the evening of November 7, went on national radio and television to inform the public that the disaster and risk management councils in the threatened regions are ready. He also mentioned that the other government assets like the PAF planes (particularly the three C-130 cargo planes) and the Navy ships are also already in position for relief and rescue operations. He however warned that Yolanda would be worse than the typhoon Pablo which caused thousands of deaths last year, and prayed that the super typhoon would not cause much damage. He also called on the public to help lessen the storm’s impact by consulting the web sites of the PAGASA (for flood and storm surge info) and the MGB (for landslide threats) to have a better idea on the danger conditions in their area.

But then Yolanda’s force (mentioned by international sources as 3.5 times more powerful than the super Hurricane Katrina that ravaged New Orleans in 2005) was just too much. Despite the preparations made by both the national and local governments to mitigate its damaging effects, it still caused thousands of deaths, unprecedented damage to property, infrastructure and vital utilities (like power, transport and communication) that caused the total isolation of regions in, and in the immediate vicinity where its center passed. To my mind, if I am to base my opinion on what I have seen on TV and heard on radio, the exceptional force of Yolanda was also manifested in not only its being able to stun, but in practically decimating the very structures installed on the ground to mitigate its effects– namely the local DRRMCs as well as the LGUs that were in its direct and immediate paths.

And why do I say this? Well because the people tasked to lead and run these structures also ended up being victims themselves, as no one was spared. So, in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon (if I am to use the situations of Guian and Tacloban as example) there was no LGU, no local DRRMC, or even a police force functioning. There were only stunned, confused, clueless and helpless survivors whose priority, understandably, were that of concern for their family members and loved ones.

Well, what has happened has happened, and I believe that the immediate concern at this point is that of getting a complete picture of the calamity’s magnitude as fast as possible, pinpointing and rescuing those that can still be rescued, and speeding up the delivery of relief and aid to the injured and survivors, as well as the others that are affected, estimated by the NDRRMC to number as much as 9.68 million people in 41 provinces (http://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/11/11/1255515/over-9.6-million-people-affected-yolanda-ndrrmc).

As the national government, hampered by its limited resources struggled to respond to the emergency, the rest of the nation, shocked as it was, immediately mobilized - as usual - to generate and provide relief aid to the typhoon’s victims. International aid also started to flow in after a few days. However, in spite of the availability of relief materials, both of the government and private sector’s relief effort encountered snags during the first 5 days after the typhoon. This, I believe, is because of the blocked roads and damaged airports, the non-availability of sufficient land transport, sea transport and airlift capability. Relief, it seems to me, was hampered as well by the absence, if not disappearance of the “local distribution network, or infrastructure” that can deliver the aid materials directly to the typhoon’s victims.

The situation however, I think, would start improving now that the President has declared a state of national calamity which allows the national government to have a more direct hand in responding to the devastation. The access road for relief cargo trucks going to Samar and Leyte have been cleared, and the number of boats ferrying cargo trucks (across San Bernardino Straight) have been increased, easing the bottleneck that stalled the movement of aid cargo trucks. Also, cargo air lift capability has been greatly enhanced by the arrival of 8 C-140 cargo planes and some helicopters from the US Air Force, and would even be improved further with the expected arrival of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, as well as other assets committed by the international community.

Due to space limitations, the lessons that can be gained from the Yolanda experience shall be covered in the next column as Part 3 of this article. Meanwhile, comments/reactions will be appreciated and can be sent through this writer’s email (sl3.mekaniko @gmail.com) or this writer’s blog (http://mekaniko-sl3.blogspot.com)